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Abstract 
When we talk about global issues, the topic of ‘climate change’ has survived decades and 
ranks at the top of the list for being the most difficult to deal with.  This paper presents an ex-
perimental setting to understand cross-cultural implications to the current global climate pol-
icy. It looks at some issues that may hinder the success of the Paris Agreement, specifically, 
considering the agreement’s national voluntary approach. 
The research is based on theoretical perception of climate being a global public good which 
ensues collective action problem and that rationality defies voluntary contribution approach 
for climate change abatement. A threshold public good game experiment is designed under 
the framework of game theory and the unique nature of the global climate change regime, to 
empirically understand cultural differences and biases, and how they affect investment deci-
sions towards a common good.  
The results of the study show that people from China have significant difference in contribu-
tion, cooperation and beliefs, compared to their western counterparts. Moreover, the group 
behaviour of the Chinese people is also significantly different than the others.  
The study also serves as a post-policy analysis regarding some of the characteristics of the in-
ternational climate change regime. A broader implication of this research can be considered 
to confirm, if, and to what extent. the national voluntary contribution approach of the Paris 
agreement will sustain, given that it requires cooperation of private actors. 
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“By comparison to what it could have been, it’s a miracle.  
By comparison to what it should have been, it’s a disaster.” – George Monbiot 
 
1. Introduction 
When we talk about global issues, the topic of ‘climate change’ has survived for decades and 
ranks at the top of the list for being the most difficult to deal with. Recently, the world gained 
a flash of optimism regarding climate change as 195 countries adopted the first-ever universal 
and legally binding global climate deal, which made the Paris agreement1 ‘historic’. It is the 
first-ever deal binding all the world's nations, rich and poor, to a commitment to cap global 
warming caused mainly by the burning of coal, oil and gas, while also acknowledging that 
each country has “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” 
(Paris Agreement: Article 2, Clause 2), meaning different nations have different capacities 
and duties for climate action, no specific division being provided between developed and de-
veloping nations.  
As of June 2017, China has sent a clear message about who will lead the fight to address cli-
mate change in the coming years, when China played a convening role by bringing together 
countries from across the globe for a discussion on the deployment of clean energy. Its partic-
ipation in international climate change negotiations has evolved from playing a peripheral 
role to steadily moving to central stage. While the president of the United States announced 
his plans to withdraw from the climate deal, China stands firmly on her decision to invest 
more than 350 million dollars in domestic renewable power generation by 2020, expanding a 
cap-and-trade program to stretch across the entire country. One of the most important devel-
opments in the Paris agreement compared to that of the Kyoto commitments 20 years ago 
was the fact that the focus shifted from developing vs developed country designation for the 
responsibility for reducing emissions to the inclusion of many of the largest emitting coun-
tries such as China and India. This particularly led to the success of persuading 195 countries 
to sign the Paris agreement. The agreement acknowledges that developed countries must take 
the lead in reducing emissions, but it does not exempt developing countries from setting and 
meeting targets. Yet, one of the main arguments presented by the US administration in favour 
of pulling out of the agreement is that the Paris Agreement is “unfair” because large polluting 
countries such as India and China are not required to do anything until 2030.  
                                                          
1 Link to the Paris Agreement: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf 
In addition to the points above, there are a number of others that should be addressed, particu-
larly relating to the role of the two major players: Chine and the US. First, the Paris Agree-
ment presents a new, and possibly worrying, model of voluntary “nationally determined con-
tributions” by governments. Many of the results are expected to be delivered by the magic of 
markets and not-yet-commercially available revolutionary technology, with world leaders 
guaranteeing the changes required to achieve the success of the Paris Agreement. The success 
of the system depends too much on the good will of world leaders. The agreement’s reliance 
on state participation and lack of mechanisms to ensure implementation begs the question: 
are voluntarism and naming and shaming enough to make it work? 
Second, China insisted on some core principles and elements that had to be incorporated into 
the agreement in Paris. For example, China has argued that developing countries should be 
allowed to let their emissions rise while their citizens grow out of poverty. The pledges that 
China made as part of the Paris agreement reflect that idea. Instead of agreeing to a firm ceil-
ing on emissions, China pledged that it would cut carbon intensity2.  
Third, it is worth pointing out that during the negotiation process, the United States pushed to 
make the agreement flexible to bring all countries on board and to keep them in the fold even 
if their situations and priorities changed3. However, despite President Trump's announcement, 
US states, cities and businesses are forging ahead, many of them with an even stronger sense 
of conviction. Even after the announcement of withdrawal of the United States from the Paris 
agreement, more than 2,500 governors, mayors and CEOs pledged to adhere to the goals of 
the Paris Agreement4. 
So, what happens if the United State pulls out of the agreement? First, the US emission re-
duction pledge under the Paris agreement accounts for more than a fifth of all the emissions 
avoided through 2030, that is 21% of the total pledge by all the nations put together. Ur-
pelainen et al 2017 argue that US non-cooperation does not essentially alter US emissions, 
which are unlikely to rise even in the absence of new federal climate policies; nor does it un-
dermine nationally determined contributions under the pledge and review as the Paris Agree-
ment has introduced a new reason for domestically driven climate policies and the cost of 
                                                          
2 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/02/world/asia/chinas-role-in-climate-change-and-possibly-in-fighting-
it.html 
3 For more on the discussion, see https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2017/06/01/trumps-paris-
agreement-withdrawal-what-it-means-and-what-comes-next/ 
4 For details, see http://www.wri.org/blog/2018/02/there-are-still-opportunities-us-china-climate-cooperation 
low-carbon technologies keeps decreasing. However, from the point of view of behavioural 
economics, the concern remains that the US non-participation in raising climate finance could 
raise high barriers to global climate cooperation in the future. The Exit of the US has not just 
raised concern that the US will miss its domestic emission reduction targets, but also that 
other parties to the Paris Agreement might backtrack on their initial pledges regarding emis-
sion reductions or financial contributions.  
There are also other features of the agreement regarding its approach in reaching the set 
goals. Evident from Article 7.2, the agreement demands a national-level policy initiation for 
the countries to be able to meet the requirements of the international agreement5, and expects 
the private sector to uphold and promote regional and international cooperation. This particu-
larly puts the success of China’s role under scrutiny as the country’s goal of meeting the 2030 
hard commitments will require effective cooperation from local governments. However, the 
past three decades of Chinese economic reforms observed a shift in control over resources 
and decision-making to local governments. This decentralisation has put environmental ad-
ministration in the hands of local officials and polluting enterprises who are primarily con-
cerned with profit making and economic growth and not the environment. The central gov-
ernment has had great difficulty obtaining effective cooperation from local governments in 
meeting energy-saving and pollution-cutting goals (Zhang, 2012b). Turning nationally deter-
mined contribution pledges into policies is the next challenge for governments, a challenge 
the failure of which means facing the threat of severe climate change (Baranzini et al. 2016). 
Moreover, to achieve greater acceptance of national climate policy and international agree-
ments, public belief in climate change and understandings of risk associated with it is crucial 
(Hopkins, Markowits, 2017) in order to gain public cooperation. Thus, to be successfully able 
to avoid severe climate change consequences, an extra layer of cooperation is required, essen-
tially cooperation at the domestic level.  
The fact that the Paris Agreement takes a new approach to universal participation based on 
national contributions in which each country sets its own objective conforms to numerous 
theories and concepts postulated by economists and policy makers over the last few decades.  
Since the approach of the current global policy on climate change demands a national-level 
                                                          
5 Article 7.2 recognises the role of non-Party stakeholders in addressing climate change, including 
cities, other subnational authorities, civil society, the private sector and others. Through Articles 8 to 
10, they are invited to scale up their efforts and support actions to reduce emissions; build resili-
ence and decrease vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change;  
policy initiation for the countries to be able to meet the requirements of the international 
agreement, it is worth evaluating the relative effectiveness of these adapted approach from a 
theoretical perspective as well as practical implications. 
 
1.1. Research Idea 
In the past four decades, debate has focused on the economic impacts of environmental deg-
radation and regulation. Recently, however, the influence of economics on climate policy has 
evolved from a narrow focus on cost to large systemic change (Harris el al, 2017). Many of 
these systemic changes are observable in the newly implemented global climate change pol-
icy agreement. While it is considered as a beacon of hope in the battle against climate change, 
it cannot be ignored that the initiation and the success of the agreement is based on an indi-
vidualistic approach6. An economic analysis of the Paris Agreement conducted by Giraud, 
Lancesseur, and Roulleau and published by Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances pro-
vides a comprehensive interpretation of the possible success of the agreement that can be ex-
pected in the future. It is also evident that the agreement conforms to some of the aspects of 
previously postulated economic theories7 regarding climate change policy construction. On 
the other hand, the impossibility of the “bottom-up” approach of the agreement to create an 
arrangement where countries are clearly held chargeable probably means that a principle-
agent problem can be expected on a global scale!  
Keeping this in mind, and the fact that the US and China are the two major players in today’s 
global climate change scenario, this research investigates cooperation in a targeted population 
sample (Chinese) in a public good situation with implications for climate change. This is 
done under the framework of economic analysis, along with the use of the logic of ‘national 
culture’ to understand aspects of public policy. More specifically, the study aims to examine 
the effect of individual beliefs (in case of climate change) and their social preferences on the 
level of cooperation in terms of distributional aspects of investing in the provision of public 
goods in an economic experimental setting. This, in turn, is expected to provide means to 
                                                          
6 “Ratifying countries can independently decide on how to lower their emissions. This is a big deal: previous 
attempts at a climate deal required that similar measures be adopted by all signing parties. However, because 
economies, cultures, and nations differ so greatly, a common denominator was hard to determine and, there-
fore, achieve. Allowing ratifying countries to determine the best way forward for them, individually, galvanized 
support for the agreement” 
7 For example, a version of Ostrom’s polycentric approach. 
tweak environmental/climate change policies that are required to be implemented on the do-
mestic level to meet national commitments in international agreements. In this thesis, I pre-
sent a model for a laboratory experiment with target groups to determine cross-cultural differ-
ences in human perceptions/beliefs regarding climate change consequences and the factors 
that influence individuals' willingness to cooperate in a threshold public good game. 
The interest of this thesis is based on the difference in attitude and effort level towards 
climate change mitigation by the two nations who are accountable for over 40% of total 
global emission: United States and China. The study will also serve as a post-policy analysis 
regarding some of the characteristics of the international climate change regime. A broader 
implication of this research can be considered to confirm, if, and to what extent. the national 
voluntary contribution approach of the Paris agreement will sustain, given that it requires 
cooperation of private actors (that is, cooperation on domestic level is required where the 
actors are assumed to be mostly profit-maximisers).  
 
1.2. Research Questions 
Combined with the idea that the cultural and/or national characteristics of a person’s belief 
might, to some degree, influence their monetary decision strategy, a laboratory experiment 
will be designed with target participants (ideally from China and US). Due to its close 
resemblance to the real-world global climate change contribution scenario, the voluntary 
contribution model with a threshold mechanism has been adopted for the experiment. In order 
to empirically determine cultural beliefs and biases, a survey will be implemented which is 
framed for climate change perceptions8. The objective of the experiment is to answer the 
following research questions: 
1) Which population tends to contribute towards the highest provision point? Are they able to 
cooperate and gain sanction for the highest threshold?  
2) How does cooperation among the two groups differ when the factor of communication is 
introduced? 
                                                          
8 based on the survey questionnaire of Robert E. O’Connor et al (1999), which was made to examine the rela-
tionship between risk perceptions and willingness to address climate change. 
3) Is there any influence of the cultural belief factors (risk perception, attitude towards the 
role of government, and general environmental beliefs) on cooperation? How does it differ (if 
it does) between the two groups? 
In the next chapter, I discuss the theoretical framework of the study, in which the topics of 
culture, global public good, collective action problem, and the game theoretic approach to it 
are explained. Furthermore, the concepts of cooperation in climate change abatement actions 
and the assumptions that come along with these concepts are also discussed in more detail.  
The chapter that follows examines the relevant studies done so far. The fourth chapter pro-
vides an insight into and justification for the chosen model. The fifth chapter considers in 
more details of the model and the design of the experiment, in that it provides the experi-
mental predictions and the general hypotheses of the study. The sixth chapter deals with the 
details of the pilot conducted for this research. The next chapter presents the results and anal-
ysis of the data collected from the experiment. A discussion is given in the chapter that fol-
lows, which describes the findings in relation to the motive of the research, the limitations 
and provides suggestions for future studies. The thesis ends with a chapter that gives the con-
cluding remarks and draws a relationship to the current policy in action.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
The main theoretical framework of the thesis falls under the framework of behavioural eco-
nomics of climate change, which deals with social preferences and the behaviour of individu-
als and nations. In this section, I attempt to sum up some of the basic theoretical concepts that 
have shaped the way climate change is dealt with in public and political economics over the 
years. As one of the concepts that this thesis deals with is ‘national culture’, the next subsec-
tion provides a brief description of what is meant by the term ‘culture’. For a better under-
standing of the national voluntary contribution and game theoretic approach to climate 
change, the subsequent subsections provide a brief look at how some of the most important 
climate economists have theorized the related issues. 
 
2.1. Culture:  
A general definition of culture refers to a system of basic common values that help shape the 
behaviour of the people in each society (Granato, et.al, 1996). In the language of economics, 
culture can be translated as the social norms and the individual beliefs that sustain Nash equi-
libria as focal points in repeated social interactions (Greif, 1994; Tabellini, 2005). Cultural 
(societal) values on a cross-cultural basis can be described as “the collective programming of 
the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another” 
(Hofstede, 2001, pp-9). This ‘programming’ typically happens early in life and leads to be-
havioural patterns that continue over time, shaping the institutional environment (Hofstede, 
1980). 
 
2.2. Public Good, Global Public Good, And Collective Action Problem 
Public goods are defined as goods that are non-rival and non-excludable in nature. It is non-
rival in the sense that consumption of the good by one person do not prevent others from us-
ing it, and it is not excludable in the sense that nobody can be excluded from consuming it. 
The characteristic of non-excludability from consumption results in a free-rider problem and 
the characteristic of non-rivalry lead to the under-provision or under-consumption of the pub-
lic good when it is financed on a voluntary basis (Stiglitz, 2000). The two defining character-
istics of public goods predetermine public goods for public provision and prevent market 
mechanisms from supplying them efficiently (Samuelson, 1954). In other words, the exist-
ence of public goods usually serves as an argument for public intervention in the economy. 
Kaul et al. (1999, pp-16) define global public goods as those which “tend towards universal-
ity in the sense that they benefit all countries, population groups and generations”. They have 
the following characteristics ‘at minimum’: 1) their ‘benefits extend to more than one group 
of countries’; and 2) they ‘do not discriminate against any population group or any set of gen-
erations, present or future’. Climate can be classified as a global public good due to the uni-
versality of its non-excludable and non-rival characteristics. 
Mancur Olson dealt with the provision of public goods by groups. He focused on the non-
excludability property of public goods. According to Olson, a "common" or "collective" good 
is one that is available to every individual, regardless of whether he or she pays for it. 
Collective goods have two characteristics: if they are available to one, they are available to all 
(access cannot be restricted), and one’s use of the good does not reduce its availability to 
others. Collective goods are those that are characterized by "jointness" of supply and the 
impossibility of exclusion. Thus, with the term collective action problem he mainly referred 
to the free rider problem in the organization of interests (Olson 1965). According to Ostrom, 
the term “collective action” refers to settings where decisions about expensive actions are 
made independently but outcomes jointly affect everyone involved. If independent decision 
makers seek only short-term material benefits, they do not achieve feasible outcomes that 
yield higher returns for all who are involved regardless of whether they make costly 
contributions (Ostrom, 2010).  Thus, the term "collective action" refers to the joint actions of 
several individuals which aim to achieve and distribute some gain through co-ordination or 
co-operation. The strategic assembly of actors can be such that they lead to difficulties in 
achieving the goals of collective action. All difficulties that arise in the pursuit of these goals 
and that are a consequence of strategic interaction are "collective action problems". 
Olson (2000, pp-71) points out that voluntary collective action works better in small groups 
and that when one party obtains sufficient benefits from a collective good that the party 
benefits by providing some of the good entirely on their own expense. However, voluntary 
provision does not work in large groups because individuals in large groups receives 
minuscule share of the benefit and is not enough to typically motivate individuals in a large 
group to contribute (Olson, 2000, pp-77). 
Barrett (2008) states that climate change may or may not be the most important problem the 
world has ever faced, but it is certainly the greatest challenge for collective action the world 
has ever faced. While there might be an exaggeration on Barrett’s part, the climate change 
regime does indeed face a collective action problem. To stop the progress of future global 
warming, greenhouse gas emissions should be lowered globally. Though most countries 
should contribute, many would prefer not to as the effort of contributing towards climate 
change is perceived to be a costly effort, and the incentive for free-riders is too strong. That 
is, countries are expected to act in their self-interest which is justified by the rational choice 
theory: a goal of rational individuals in the group is to free-ride while others pay (Olson, 
2000, pp-83).  Rational choice theory implies that an individual will act to maximise his or 
her expected utility function. 
However, the standard model of rational action submits that, while the model is influential in 
predicting the outcomes in auctions and competitive market conditions, it is complex in ex-
plaining the coordination of collective action. “Recent work in game theory – often in a sym-
biotic relationship with evidence from experimental studies – has set out to provide an alter-
native micro theory of individual behaviour that begins to explain anomalous findings.” 
(Ostrom 2000, pp-138). 
2.3. Game theoretical approach to the collective action problem 
The first thing to look at when examining a collective action problem is the payoff structure. 
Who gains from the results of climate change and is less interested in abating it? The greater 
the mutuality of interests, the greater the likelihood the players would choose to cooperate; 
the greater the conflict of interests, the more likely the players would choose to defect.  
Several authors claim that the climate change collective action problem is a 
prisoner’s dilemma (Barrett, 2006, Gardiner, 2001). The prisoners’ dilemma is a simple case 
to demonstrate the decision dilemma of a situation with different pay-offs depending on the 
other player’s action. This type of games has a unique Nash equilibrium. The Pareto-optimal 
outcome is the outcome that is preferred both collectively and individually in prisoners’ 
dilemma games, that is, the pareto-optimal outcome is preferred over the equilibrium 
outcome. However, pareto-optimal outcomes are not usually achieved by the players as there 
is an incentive for the individual to deviate if the other player conforms. Thus, the players are 
tempted to defect.  In the prisoners’ dilemma, both the Pareto-optimal outcome and the Nash 
equilibrium are equality outcomes (Holzinger, 2003).  
In assessing voluntary contribution in climate change abatement issues, prisoner’s dilemma is 
a good basis to answer questions like: Shall a participating country exceed the settled 
emission quotas? Cheat or not in emission reports? Do the short-term individual and the long-
term global interest meet each other in carbon dioxide emission?  
The assurance/stag hunt game has been more preferred model for the representation of the 
climate change collective action problem. The assurance game describes a state when players 
are unable to seize an opportunity for cooperation that seems obvious. There is one best 
solution, and if it is spoiled, the worst payoff will be realized. There is no inequality in the 
equilibria, and players maximize joint gains in the optimal equilibria. The main problem for 
the players is to co-ordinate their strategies such that at least one of the equilibria, and 
hopefully the optimal equilibrium, will result (Holzinger, 2003). That is why players are very 
cautious and do not act in uncertain circumstance but wait for the other’s action or own 
certainty. However, after a while, cost of passed time matters, so the players will accept the 
second-best solution. This game eliminates the countries’ motivation for free riding. The stag 
hunt game models, for example, the situation when small or less developed economies are 
waiting for larger countries’ initiation or technologically first comers’ advantage (Kutasi, 
2010). 
Table X represents a stag hunt game between the two countries. Here, the players are willing 
to contribute to reduce emission given that one player already cooperates.  But if one of the 
players is not cooperating, the other will defect as well. Hence, reducing emission becomes 
the first preference for the countries in anticipation of the other to cooperate. 
Table X: Climate Change and Assurance/Stag hunt game 
Country A 
 
Country B 
 Reduce Emission Don’t Reduce Emission 
Reduce Emission 4, 4 1, 3 
Don’t Reduce Emission 3, 1 2, 2 
 
But the dominant strategy of both players is not to contribute, that is, to free ride. The game 
results in a Nash equilibrium characterized by not contributing to reduce emission: 
combination (2,2). On the other hand, a Pareto optimal situation would be reached if both 
players contributed to reduce emission: combination (4,4); and the mutual benefit was 
maximized (mutual benefit=4+4). However, without the intervention of an external authority, 
this form will always result in a non-efficient outcome as there are no incentives for 
individuals to contribute and emission level will not be reduced. 
In order to get the Pareto-optimal outcome, a better approach is the chicken game. As Kutasi 
(2010) notes, the chicken game is a useful frame to describe a situation when two or more 
opposite approaches, opinions, interests are wanted to be realized for any price by the 
players. Table Y represents the same situation as before but in the form of a chicken game: 
Table Y: Climate Change and Chicken game 
Country A 
 
Country B 
 Reduce Emission Don’t Reduce Emission 
Reduce Emission 4, 4 4, 5 
Don’t Reduce Emission 5, 4 3, 3 
 
According to the payoffs in this game, neither player has a dominant strategy. Though, there 
are two equal Nash equilibria ((5,4); (4,5)) representing a situation where one player 
contributes while the other does not. In this case, the equilibria are even efficient as 5+4 > 
4+4. If the players managed to coordinate their actions, they could reach the efficient 
outcome and maximize social benefit. The problem, however, is that usually the players do 
not get the opportunity to communicate to agree on a joint strategy; even if they can 
communicate, there is no control or enforcement mechanism ensuring that the agreed strategy 
will be respected.  
The application of the prisoner’s dilemma in common goods problems does not necessarily 
consider the expectations of the different actors. In case of global climate deals, if a state 
expects the others to free ride, it is likely to defect. Ostrom (1998) supports this matter by 
finding that those who intend to cooperate in a particular one-shot social dilemma also expect 
cooperation to be returned at a much higher rate than those who intend to defect. 
 Thus, there is an emphasis on the role of institutions in the expectations of states. Institutions 
can alter a country’s expectations about the actions of others through the provision of 
information and the credible threat of retaliation. 
Incentives and institutional structure are known to affect the divergence between individual 
and collective outcomes for public good provision (Andreoni 1988; Issac, Walker, and 
Samuelson 1954), and knowledge of how individuals respond empirically continues to limit 
the outcomes supported by mechanisms proposed to generate revenues in support of public 
goods. The divergence between individually and socially optimal outcomes encourages the 
development of mechanisms that enable individuals to act according to their own interests 
while simultaneously maximizing the total welfare of society. 
 
2.3. Concepts of Cooperation 
From the perspective of the participating countries, many reasons can be considered as to 
why they would choose to contribute. First, given that climate change is one of the most im-
portant issues of our time, participation would give the country a good reputation and conse-
quently the ability to achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion. 
When the use of reciprocity is common - this being the situation where one cooperates on the 
first move and then does whatever the other player did on the previous move - it is beneficial 
to have the reputation of ‘co-operator’ because it allows a state to engage in mutually produc-
tive social exchanges (Ostrom, 1999, Ostrom 2010).  Secondly, even if a country is not di-
rectly affected by future climate change, it would still be indirectly affected because of global 
warming. Moreover, the climate change regime is very fragile and one country dropping out 
can thwart the efforts of the entire coalition when it comes to international agreements. 
Ostrom (1998) claims that norms can be important in public good problems and have to be 
factored into the objective costs of action but the influence of norms cannot be discounted in 
the case of climate change. Whether norms feature heavily depends on the social distance be-
tween the actors (Kopelman et al, 2002). Groups which interact repeatedly have higher coop-
eration rates in social dilemmas than groups that are rebuilt every time. Ostrom (1998) 
found that face-to-face communication is an especially effective method of increasing trust, 
creating and reinforcing norms and developing a group identity, which enables cooperation to 
take place. 
 
2.3.1 Assumptions 
Various circumstances in our daily life involve social dilemmas and the solutions of which 
require cooperation, most of which entails the provision of public goods or the manage-
ment of common-pool resources. Maintaining cooperation in those settings characterises one 
of the major attainments of our society as cooperating in social dilemmas calls for overcom-
ing the temptation to free-ride, often making contributions towards a common good at the ex-
pense of personal benefits. Climate change is considered global public good9 and to prevent 
free-riding, we need a multilateral negotiation to obtain cooperative solution. As the research 
is focused on cooperation among individuals in groups, most of the theoretical assumptions 
are drawn from previous studies on cooperation, especially on the intuitions drawn from the 
works of Elinor Ostrom.  
Cooperation represents an anomaly that infrequently fits the model of a rational actor (utility 
maximizing agent) from an economic perspective (Dawes and Thaler, 1988). Yet, 
cooperation is often observed, suggesting that either individuals are not always rational actors 
or that preferences on personal benefits of individuals shift when acting as part of a group. 
Even though it could be tempting to assume that our societies can operate with morality and 
in public spirit (Hirschman 1984), understanding cooperation is a significantly 
challenging task for economists, more so when we are talking about cooperation on a global 
                                                          
9 Public good is a good that is non-rival and non-excludable in nature. Detailed discussion in Chapter 3. 
scale. Basing on the traditional economic perspective of rational selfishness, under the 
principle that the representative Homo economicus pursues his objectives according to 
narrow self-interest, the first assumption of the research can be stated as follows:  
Assumption 1: Cooperating for the provision of public goods, entails sacrificing individual 
interests for group interests, which goes against both individual rationality and, from an 
evolutionary perspective, natural selection. 
According to Elinor Ostrom, subjects may be willing to cooperate, even in a global setting, if 
they expect others to reciprocate. Ostrom (2009) supports this intuition by providing evidence 
on several local communities and subnational entities that organised and jointly engaged in 
favour of climate-change mitigation. Whether policy-makers will be able to influence 
individuals' willingness to cooperate also depends on their consideration of when and why 
cooperation in the climate commons works. Simon Caney, on determining the polluter or the 
‘unit of analysis’ in terms of polluter-pays principle, proves that while there are numerous 
contributing agents, such as individuals, economic corporations, states, international regimes 
and institutions, etc, “the relevant unit of analysis is the state and that the other options 
collapse into it” (Gardiner et al, pp-127). Given that states are formed by groups of 
individuals who are, supposedly, rational economic actors, it can be deduced that 
states/governments will always act to maximize their own utility even in an international 
setting (for example, when negotiating with another country). Thus, it can be implied that 
cooperation among/between states encompass similar characteristics of individual 
cooperation. This leads us to the second assumption of the research: 
Assumption 2: International cooperation follows the pattern of individual co-operations. 
 
3. Literature Review 
A wide range of studies done on how to approach the issue of climate change has sprung the 
literature on distinct categories. Storm (2009, pp:1030-1031) presents a radical view against 
‘fossil fuel capitalism’ and an argument against market-based measures to mitigate climate 
change. According to Storm, global warming is a public good problem and a capitalist society 
is simply inept in dealing with it. Market is incapable of thinking ahead to prepare and protect 
from the needs of the future and hence, market failure exists widely in the climate market. 
The world needs systemic transformation based on growth scepticism, a planned transition to 
a non-fossil fuel economy, democratic reform, climate justice, and changed global knowledge 
and corporate and financial power structure (Storm, 2009, pp:1032). A comprehensive study 
put forward by Ostrom (2012) suggests a ‘polycentric’ approach to climate change policy-
makers. That is, neither a market-based approach nor a command and control base approach 
is efficient on its own to tackle the global warming problem. The government, in this case, is 
required to play an active role in creating incentives for individual market actors to perform 
in a way that helps alleviate climate change. To be able to avoid disastrous consequences, it is 
important that the vulnerable economies grasp the idea of adaptability to climate change 
(adaptation refers to adjustments by individuals and the collective behaviour of 
socioeconomic systems). It is crucial that actions that increase adaptive capability are 
considered as they are in correspondence to the activities required for sustainable 
development (Smit et al, 2003). However, it has been proven time and again by researchers 
that a rising temperature effect the poor and developing countries with higher intensity than it 
does to the developed countries (Burke et al, 2016; Doda, 2013; Storm, 2009). 
As the global climate change agreements has the characteristic occurrence in the 
decentralized international space, it makes it a common pool resource (CPR) problem. This 
problem was described and explained by Garrett Hardin (1968) as the tragedy of commons. 
Herdin gives an example involving a common pasture in which it is expected that every 
herdsman, being rational, is going to try keep as many cattle on the commons as possible in-
order to try and make the most profit which leads to overgrazing, resulting is lowered 
productivity causing each herdsman to add more cattle to bring their profits back up. It is in 
this desire for self-interest that the tragedy of the commons arises This type of “motivation to 
increase the using without limit in a limited world” (Hardin 1968, pp-1244) is very often 
temptation in case of the global resources like the climate. 
In assurance of the fact that all individuals are selfish, Ostrom (1999) illustrates a model to 
handle the common-pool resource problem regarding climate change. She states that solving 
common-pool resource problems involves two distinct elements: restricting access and 
creating incentives (usually by assigning individual rights to, or shares of the resource) for 
users to invest in the resource instead of overexploiting it. Both changes are needed. Humans 
adopt a narrow, self-interested perspective in many settings, but can also use reciprocity to 
overcome social dilemmas. The concept of property rights plays a significant role in instilling 
appropriate incentives to cooperate.  
• Property Rights: The four broad types of property rights (Ostrom 1998, 1999) to 
regulate common-pool resources are summed up in Table 3. Degradation and 
potential destruction are the consequences when valuable common-pool resources are 
left to an open-access regime. Ostrom provides evidence to reject the notion that 
resource users cannot themselves change from no property rights (open access) to 
group or individual property. However, studies show that no single type of property 
regime works efficiently, fairly, and sustainably in relation to all common-pool 
resources. This is particularly true in case of the climate change issues as the 
problems continue to exist in regulated settings. It is important to identify which of 
Ostrom’s design principles are more relevant to successfully govern the common-pool 
resource problem associated with climate change. 
 
Table Z: Property Rights to regulate common-pool resources 
Property Rights Characteristics 
Open access Absence of enforced property rights 
Group Property Resource rights held by a group of users 
who can exclude others 
Individual Property Resource rights held by individuals (or 
firms) who can exclude others  
Government Property Resource rights held by a government 
that can regulate or subsidize use. 
 
• Ostrom’s Design Principles: Ostrom identified eight design principles that enable 
CPR groups to effectively manage their resources: clearly defined boundaries, 
proportional equivalence between benefits and costs, collective-choice arrangements, 
monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict resolution mechanisms, minimal recognition 
of rights to organize, and appropriate coordination among relevant groups. Emphasis 
should be put in monitoring and appropriate coordination when talking about the 
climate change regime. As discussed earlier, managing a common is fundamentally 
vulnerable to free-riding and active exploitation. Unless these undermining strategies 
can be detected at relatively low cost by norm-abiding members of the group, the 
tragedy of the commons will occur (Wilson et al, 2012). Moreover, for groups that are 
part of larger social systems, there must be appropriate coordination among relevant 
groups. Every sphere of activity has an optimal scale. Large scale governance requires 
finding the optimal scale for each sphere of activity and appropriately coordinating 
the activities, a concept called polycentric governance (Wilson et al, 2012; Ostrom, 
2012). 
Giddens (2008) puts forward an intriguing suggestion to mitigate the climate challenge by 
putting the international market and the state together by declaring that the problem can only 
be solved by integrating the government, NGOs, individual households and business entities: 
in which the role of the government is to monitor and ensure that every individual institute 
has an effective role in reducing greenhouse gas emission. An even comprehensive study put 
forward by Ostrom (2012) suggests a polycentric approach to climate change policy-makers. 
That is, neither a market-based approach nor a command and control base approach is 
efficient on its own to tackle the global warming problem. The government, in this case, is 
required to play an active role in creating incentives for individual market actors to perform 
in a way that helps alleviate climate change. Ostrom also points out that framing problems 
related to resource use in a social context do affect actions. Thus, numerous measures could 
be taken by the government on a micro-level to influence cut in energy consumption. For 
example, government could provide subsidies to households that purchased a solar power 
electricity, this in turn would raise the consumption of solar power; creating competition 
among households and groups and giving them credits for using less electricity could reduce 
carbon emission from households, that is, providing incentives to cooperate. 
Because of its complexity and high uncertainty, in case of climate change the variable sum 
and dynamic approach is the most useful to model the behaviour of actors of international 
relation (Kutasi, 2010). As certainty of occurrence and local/regional impact of temperature 
change gets stronger, it has repercussion on the preference of decision makers in the 
international space. Change in preferences can be caused, also, by change in political 
leadership or regime. (Keohane 1984, pp-116). The climate change related behaviours can be 
easily modelled under game theoretic framework. “Game theory is concerned with the 
actions of individuals who are conscious that their actions affect each other” (Rasmussen 
1992, pp-21).  Thus, In the next section, literature on game theoretic experiments are 
discussed. 
3.1. Previous Experiments and Climate Change 
Milinski et al (2006) conducted a lab experiment focusing on the issue of expert information 
about climate as well as opportunity to build a reputation and showed that cooperation is en-
hanced in the treatment in which participants were well informed about climate, and it was 
also enhanced in the “public rounds” in which participants built a reputation and experienced 
the costs or benefits of that reputation in the indirect reciprocity game. Milinski et al (2008) 
confirmed a threshold public good game on risk perception and the results of the experiment 
the difficulty of collectively dealing with even high levels of risk. Another lab experiment by 
Tavoni et al (2011) studied inequality and communication in a threshold public good game 
and showed that while inequality made it difficult to achieve cooperation, communication 
cause success in cooperation and meeting the threshold. Milinski et al (2011) studied inequal-
ity and intermediate climate targets in another threshold public good game. Jacqet et al 
(2013) conducted an experiment focusing on intragenerational and intergenerational time dis-
counting and found that majority of groups cooperated when the benefits were paid out the 
next day. However, five of these experiments were done on a population sample from Ger-
many and only one was done on a population sample from South Africa. 
Yamagishi (1988) and Fehr and Gachter (2002) have shown that sanctions, even costly to the 
punisher, work as a mechanism to enforce cooperation. Effect of punishment, however, 
depends on the society: in particular, Russians have shown to exhibit large share of antisocial 
(spiteful) punishments (Herrmann et.al, 2008) 
In general, people are known to be reasonably good at reaching disequilibrium cooperative 
decision (Ostrom et al., 1993); however, in case of global disagreements, coordination in 
social dilemmas may be difficult (Kass et al, 2015). Barrett and Dunnenberg (2012), Milinski 
e.a. (2009) and others discuss the role of coordination in climate-change issues, and show 
experimentally that cooperation is feasible, even under conditions of payoff uncertainty and 
free-riding. A large literature (Chen and Li, 2010; Grimalda et al, 2016) also shows that 
social image may be more important than sanctions to promote cooperation. 
 
3.2. Public Good Provision and Climate Change 
There are two lines of literature regarding the public good provision game. One is called the 
“linear” public good provision game10. The linear game asks subjects to allocate a certain 
number of tokens between a private fund that benefits only the individual investor and a 
group fund that generates profits for everyone. which is the voluntary provision mechanism. 
The other line of literature uses the provision point mechanism to provide the public good in 
a discrete unit (e.g., Alboth, Lerner, and Shalev 2001; Laussel and Palfrey 2003; Schram, 
Offerman, and Sonnemans 2008). The provision point mechanism evolves from the binary 
public good game that asks individuals to make decisions on whether to contribute toward a 
public good. The provision point mechanism can also relax the dichotomous choice 
constraint so that each subject can make a continuous offer (Cadsby and Maynes 1999). The 
public good is funded if the aggregated offers reach or surpass the predetermined cost. The 
linear public good game asks participants to act against their own best interest, at the margin. 
In contrast, the provision point mechanism, at least in principle, enables participants to 
contribute toward provision up to their marginal benefit. Thus, the provision point 
mechanism could enable contributors to benefit such that their benefit always equals or 
exceeds their own cost for contribution. The incentive to free ride or cheap ride is then 
motivated by rent seeking or strategic opportunities to avoid cost partially or entirely. Bagnoli 
and McKee (1991) find that a provision point mechanism together with money back 
guarantee can potentially induce Pareto efficient outcomes in a single-unit provision 
environment. 
Significant amount of effort has been given by empirical studies to identify the main factors 
that affect the likelihood of successful collective action (Ostrom, 2001). In public good 
experiments (Davis, Holt 1993; Ledyard 1995), as well as in other forms of social dilemmas, 
it has been established that face-to-face communication produces considerable rises in co-
operation (Ostrom and Walker 1997). For example, individuals who are primarily distrusting 
are more willing to contribute to sanctioning schemes and are likely to be transformed into 
strong co-operators by the availability of a sanctioning mechanism (Fehr and Gächter, 2000).   
The fact that face-to-face communication is more efficient than computerised signalling is 
explained by the language structure and the “intrinsic costs involved in hearing the intonation 
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and seeing the body language of those who are genuinely angry at free riders” (Ostrom 2000, 
pp-141). 
 
4. Public Good Provision: Experimental Models and Assumption 
As the focus of the thesis is on voluntary contribution, this chapter provides a detailed discus-
sion of the voluntary contribution mechanism and the type of modification that is adopted for 
this research experiment.  
 
4.1. Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) 
A simple model is used to describe the central problem with public goods called the 
voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) in game theoretic experiments. Arifovic and 
Leyard (2012, pp- 7) provides a complex modelling of a VCM game, which can be simplified 
as follows: in a VCM experimental setting, participants are provided with an amount of token 
as initial endowment (a disposable income), and is given a situation in which they are asked 
to decide which part of their endowment they would contribute to a group account used to 
produce units of public good and which part they would keep for themselves. For further 
clarification, suppose, there are N players and Player i has endowment 𝑒𝑖 of tokens and 
chooses a number 𝑥𝑖 to contribute to a public account (choices are simultaneous) keeping 
(𝑒𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖) to herself. The total earning of the individual player can thus be represented by the 
following model: 
𝑒𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑚 ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
where, m is the marginal per capital return (or MPCR). Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR) 
or marginal per capita income is the ratio of profit from one payment unit invested in public 
goods and the opportunity cost of investing of that unit (Holt, 2005: pp- 293). 
Considering only two players, standard VCM can be modelled as the Prisoner’s dilemma, 
where each player makes his/her decision whether to contribute to a public good or not. The 
dominant strategy of both players in this case is not to contribute to the public good and the 
game results in single Nash equilibrium corresponding to a situation where no one 
contributes anything (and the public good is not provided) (Davis, Holt, 2003). 
If, 1/N < m < 1 this is a public goods problem. Consider an example where there are N = 4 
players, and everyone is endowed with 100 tokens and the MPCR is m = 0.5, What are the 
efficiency implications? If everyone keeps tokens to themselves, each earns 100 while if 
everyone contributes, each earns 0.5 × 4 × 100 = 200. But, this is not the Nash equilibrium. 
Modelling a standard VCM with two players as Prisoner’s dilemma, where each player 
makes his/her decision whether to contribute to a public good or not. The dominant strategy 
of both players in this case is not to contribute to the public good and the game results in 
single Nash equilibrium corresponding to a situation where no one contributes anything and 
the public good is not provided (Davis, Holt, 2003). In the example of four players, suppose 
everyone else is giving the full amount: if one person gives the full amount he/she earns 100 
but if the player gives nothing he/she will earn 250, which results in a fall out of cooperation 
and free riding takes place. Thus, everyone should give zero to the public account in a Nash 
equilibrium.  
Together with the condition regarding m, implies two phenomena typical for the problem of 
the voluntary provision of public goods (or, more generally, for social dilemmas):  
1. The dominant strategy of player i is fully free-rider, i.e., 𝑥𝑗 = 0.  
2. The aggregate payoff is maximized if everyone fully cooperates, i.e., 𝑥𝑗 = 𝑒𝑖 i for every 
player i. 
Two variables affect payoffs in the basic VCM game: the number of participants and the 
MPCR. The larger the MPCR, the less people are deviating from best response by 
cooperating and the less expensive cooperation is. Early investigators hypothesized raising 
the MPCR would increase cooperation (Bohm, 1972; Dawes et al., 1977). A large N will 
increase the efficiency of cooperating as every token helps more people, and hence, should 
increase cooperation; but there is also a chance of coordination failure (or at least make it 
harder) with larger groups and altruistic motives become less salient in a less personal setting. 
Thus, cooperation could decrease. 
Previous experiments pursued to answer the question like how much people are willing 
voluntarily contribute for public goods. As shown by Davis, Holt (1993), the usual rate of 
contribution is between 40-60% of the maximum total group contributions in the first round 
and the share tends to decrease in the following rounds. Marvell and Ames (1980) provided 
the results of an experiment using VCM which considerably weakened the conventionally 
accepted conclusion of the traditional economic assumption the individuals are utility 
maximisers and hence will not contribute (as their payoff will be lower if they do). They 
showed that in a situation of contributing to a public good, in most cases, participants tended 
to defy the rational theory and did voluntarily contribute to the provision of public good. 
However, the results of further experiments showed that repeating the game under the given 
conditions brings almost certainly higher level of free riding than in case of one-shot game 
(Isaac, McCue and Plott, 1985).  
The earlier experiments have shown that it is possible to specify a “usual range” of 
contribution level to public goods11. The presence of the range suggests that the level of 
voluntary provision can be affected not only stochastically but also systematically. Thus, the 
positive or negative effect on the contribution amount also depends on the characteristics of 
such factors that influence contribution. Ledyard (1995) was the first to provide a review of 
the factors affecting the rate of voluntary contributions to public goods, and divided those 
characteristics into the three following groups: 
1) Environmental factors: number of participants, the degree of economic profitability of free 
riding, the rate of repetition of the situation or gender.  
2) Personal factors: economic education, risk aversion, beliefs, innate altruism, experience, 
learning effect, identification of oneself with a group, etc.  
3) Factors associated with the nature of the experiment, that is, factors defining the particular 
form of the environment and the mechanism: the possibility of communication or 
punishment. 
 
4.2. Threshold Public Good Game 
To increase contribution, variation in the payoff structure can be induced in the VCM by 
introducing a specified threshold (Holt, 2005: pp- 301). With a threshold, or provision point, 
the provision of a public good is conditioned by some minimal amount of contributions. 
Unless this amount is collected, the public good is not provided. This modification changes 
the theoretical equilibrium, and even the type of game: Suppose, a public good will only be 
provided if a sufficient amount of money, T is invested. Contributions to the public good 
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rized by Chaudhuri (2008).  
generates the same amount as before but only if 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝑇. This family of mechanisms is 
sometimes referred to as a threshold public good or a pivot point mechanism (Isaac, Schmidt 
and Walker, 1989). There are several variations that alter what happens to contributions 
higher than the threshold. The threshold public good game can be run with varying provision 
point, along with different rebate or ‘money back’ treatments. In case of failing to meet the 
threshold, two basic mechanisms of further behaviour can be offered: either the funds given 
for public goods are considered lost and contributors will not be refunded, or participants are 
ensured that if there are not enough funds contributed to the public good, the invested funds 
will be returned to the contributors.  
Introducing a threshold mechanism to the voluntary contribution mechanism, causes the 
occurrence of two optimal Nash equilibriums: 
1) A group of inefficient Nash equilibriums where the threshold is not reached and the public 
good is not provided, and,  
2) A group of efficient equilibriums corresponding to a situation where the threshold is just 
reached, a public good is provided, and the entire group behaves efficiently.  
Number of such equilibria increases with the number of participants. Croson, Marks (2000, 
pp-3) formulates the conditional models that serves as the conditions to satisfy the Nash 
equilibrium in a threshold public good game:  
∑ 𝜎𝑖 = 𝐾𝑖  ____________(i) 
𝜎𝑖  ≤  𝑣𝑖   ____________(ii) 
where K is the cost of providing the public good (threshold level), 𝜎𝑖 is a contribution of a 
player i to a public good and 𝑣𝑖 is individual valuation of the given public good by the player 
i. The explanation behind these conditions is that, since each of the participants can 
contribute with a different amount, Nash equilibrium is constituted at individual contributions 
where the threshold is reached exactly, and the sum of contributions equals the costs of a 
public good, and where none of the individuals contributes more than his own valuation of 
the public good is. Provision point could serve as a focal point leading to high contributions 
or could drive people from making even modest contributions. 
It is possible to observe where the sum of contributions to the threshold limit meets in case of 
repeated games, which consequently enables to point out the optimal  Nash equilibrium. 
Based on the theory developed by Bagnoli, Lipman (1989), that does not mean that a free 
riding behaviour does not exist in a threshold provision game. The theory only implies that 
with the gradual increase in the threshold it is possible to expect an increase in contributions, 
given that the threshold is lower than the overall benefit of potential contributors. 
 
5. Experimental Design 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, for a country to be able to meet the set goals in the Paris Agree-
ment, cooperation from the private actors are essential. The intention of the thesis is to be 
able to take into account some of the more practical climate change policy scenario. The ob-
jective of the study is to address some of those real-world factors by means of laboratory ex-
periment. Hence, the experimental design is required to imitate the real-world scenario as 
closely as possible. The factors and the mechanisms used to reflect them are as follows:  
1: If national/domestic level actors can cooperate to meet climate change abatement targets 
set by the international body.  
In the laboratory experiment, it is done by providing different provision points (to depict set 
targets), in which, the group members must cooperate to reach an investment threshold to-
gether for sanction and if the group’s total investment does not reach the threshold, the 
money invested will be lost. 
2: If private actors act altruistically to meet the high ambition of emission control by forgoing 
their own earnings to meet the high investment demand towards climate change abatement.  
This is done in the experiment by providing increasing threshold/provision points which de-
picts increasing risk in investment (chances of losing more money if others in the group does 
not invest enough to meet the targets). 
3: Does the cooperation differ on a domestic level (where the population belongs to the same 
country) and on a global level (where people from different countries must cooperate with 
each other).  
The experimental setup is done by dividing the participants into two groups, where one is a 
culturally homogenous group and the other is a culturally heterogenous group. The two 
groups are given the same situations through-out the experiment so that their responses can 
be observed in the same environmental setting. 
4: Different nations display different levels of climate change belief and/or scepticism and 
people’s belief regarding global climate change consequences might display a national/cul-
tural bias. Does cultural belief influence the level of cooperation?  
In order to empirically measure their cultural biases in the lab, a short survey will be con-
ducted after the experiment in which the participants have to record their demographic infor-
mation and respond to ten sentences regarding climate change risk perception, government 
role, environmental belief, human rights and global cooperation on Likert scale of agreeable-
ness/disagreeableness. 
To sum up, the experimental design is that of a threshold public good game, in which, they 
are provided with an initial endowment to invest in the provision of a public good. The game 
is repeated in several rounds with increasing provision points. The participants are selected as 
such that at least one group comprises of individuals who belongs to the same nationality. In 
order to represent national and global contribution, and to realize the effect of communication 
on cooperation, the game is played in two stages:  
• The first stage: In the first stage, individuals are expected to cooperate for the provi-
sion of the public good without communicating with their group members. This stage 
of the game is representative of domestic/national effort where individuals are re-
quired to make the decision to invest in public good or to maximize their own income. 
There are 10 rounds in this stage, the first 5 rounds are with low provision points and 
the next 5 rounds have increased provision points. 
• The second stage: Cooperation effort in the second stage is representative of global 
effort. This part of the game too is comprised of 10 rounds, except there is a treatment 
factor added: the group members can communicate with each other before choosing to 
invest. The provision point in this stage is also increasing but at a higher rate than that 
of stage 1. 
 
Individual payoff is realised according to the following model:  
𝑒𝑖 = (𝑡𝑖 − 𝑥) + 𝑅𝑝𝑝 ,  0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑡𝑖 
Where, 𝑒𝑖 is individual earning, 𝑡𝑖 is total initial endowment, 𝑥 is amount invested by player 𝑖 
and 𝑅𝑝𝑝 is provision point return which is realized if the total group investment is greater 
than or equal to the threshold provision points. 
A short survey will be conducted after the experiment (20 rounds) in which the participants 
are asked to record their demographic information, along with their response on ten sentences 
on Likert scale (agree/disagree). The survey questionnaire was constructed based on the sur-
vey questionnaire of Robert E. O’Connor et al (1999) which was made to examine the rela-
tionship between risk perceptions and willing-ness to address climate change. However, only 
the parts of the questionnaire that is relevant to this study is selected. That is, ten statements 
are selected from the original questionnaire which consisted of three statements on risk per-
ception; four statements on governments’ role, of which, two were positively framed and two 
were negatively framed; two statements on environmental belief; one on human rights and 
one on cooperation. 
 
5.1. Experimental Predictions  
Based on the results of previous experiments as reported from Chapter 2 through 4, as well as 
the design of the experiment, the following predictions are made for this experiment:  
1) Cooperation will decrease with an increase in number of rounds. As mentioned in Chapter 
4, Section 4.1, repetition of the game will tempt an increase in free-riding.  
2) Once high cooperation is met, the following rounds will have high level of cooperation as 
well due to reciprocal behaviour. Similarly, rounds in which more people defect, will be fol-
lowed by rounds with high level of defection.  
3) Communication will cause a rise in cooperation level, that is, average cooperation in the 
second stage of the game in every round will be higher compared to that of stage one as play-
ers will be concerned about reputation as a defector among their group members.  
4) Individuals with higher agreeableness to the risk perception statements will tend to have 
higher average investment.  
5)  Individuals with higher agreeableness to the positive government role statements will 
have higher average investment. Similarly, individuals who are more agreeable with the neg-
ative government questions will have lower average investment towards the public good pro-
vision. 
5.2. Hypothesis 
Considering an experimental setting with target population sample from China and United 
States, and the stated assumptions so far, the following hypotheses are constructed:  
• Hypothesis 1: Both population sample will have a decreasing rate of contribution with 
an increase in rounds. 
• Hypothesis 2: Effect of communication will be undermined by rebate rules (money 
back guarantee will induce higher cooperation while no money back guarantee will 
cause defection even after communication) 
• Hypothesis 3: Groups with high agreeability to risk perception, environmental belief, 
human rights and global cooperation statements will have higher average investment, 
hence more cooperative.  
• Hypothesis 4: Groups with higher agreeability to positive statements on government 
roles/ high disagreeability to negative statements on government roles will reach 
higher threshold.   
 
6. Pilot Experiment 
A pilot for the experiment was done on 26 March 2018 at University of Tampere. The initial 
sample population targets were of people from China and Americans living in Tampere. Invi-
tation to volunteer for the experiment was sent out through social media groups and personal 
contacts and it was declared that there would be a monetary reward. However, due to the lack 
of American participants, the sample population consisted of 7 Chinese participants, and 7 
participants from America and Europe. Thus, the one group of culturally homogeneous par-
ticipants were represented by the Chinese sample population (Group 1) and the rest of the 
participants belonged to the culturally heterogeneous group (Group 2). All 14 participants 
were provided with clear instructions on the experiment, which came along with a declaration 
that the experiment was solely for the purpose of this master’s thesis study and enabled them 
to leave at the beginning of the experiment (Appendix A). 
6.1. Experiment Set-up 
A pilot for the experiment was done on 26 March 2018 at University of Tampere. The initial 
sample population targets were of people from China and Americans living in Tampere. Invi-
tation to volunteer for the experiment was sent out through social media groups and personal 
contacts and it was declared that there would be a monetary reward. However, due to the lack 
of American participants, the sample population consisted of 7 Chinese participants, and 7 
participants from America and Europe. Thus, the one group of culturally homogeneous par-
ticipants were represented by the Chinese sample population (Group 1) and the rest of the 
participants belonged to the culturally heterogeneous group (Group 2). All 14 participants 
were provided with clear instructions on the experiment, which came along with a declaration 
that the experiment was solely for the purpose of this master’s thesis study and enabled them 
to leave at the beginning of the experiment (Appendix A).  
The experiment was conducted on an online interface designed and written by Charles Holt. 
For access, the participants had to log in to game sessions on the website: 
http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/login.htm with different session names for the two stages of 
the game, instructions for which were included in the experiment instruction provided in Ap-
pendix A. 
The reward payment was in Euros and the conversion of the electronic amount was clearly 
mentioned in the instruction. The reward was due to the highest earners of the groups in each 
stage. The electronic amount is converted as follows:  
1 electronic currency = 1 x 0.10 Euros 
There was no show up fee. However, there was no restriction on the maximum amount that 
can be earned either. 
 
6.3. Hypothesis 
Based on the set up and sample population structure, the previously stated hypothesises are 
reformed as follows: 
1) H01: Defection will occur at a higher rate in Rounds 6 to 10 in both stages due to high 
threshold points. 
2) H02: Communication will increase average investment in all rounds of Stage 2  
3) H03-1: Average investment will be higher in Stage 2 Rounds 1 to 5 due to the rebate rule of 
return 
     H03-2: Effect of communication in Stage 2 Rounds 6 to 10 will be lower as rebate rule of 
return is removed and risk of losing money is increased.  
4) H04-1: Individuals/groups with a more agreeable risk perceptions of climate change have 
higher average investment/is more cooperative (positive correlation between the agreeable 
score on risk perception and the investment in high threshold public good).  
    H04-2: Group displaying lack of trust in Government Role in dealing with climate change 
will tend to contribute less. 
 
6.4. The Game: Treatments and Pay-off 
The experiment consisted of a total of 20 rounds. In each round, the participants were 
matched with the same group of six other people. The amount earned by each participant is 
determined by the decisions that the group seven make. 
In the first treatment of the first stage of the game, there were 5 rounds, and in all rounds par-
ticipants began with a new endowment of 25 tokens, each of which could either be kept or in-
vested. All seven people in the group were provided with the same amount of token. Every-
body earns money in the same manner: $0.10 for each token kept, and a per-person fixed pay-
ment that depends on the total number of tokens invested by the seven people. The range of 
total group investments and provision points in Stage 1, Rounds 1 to 5 are given in table 1:  
Table 1: Stage1: Treatment 1: Rebate=No 
Range of Total Group Investments: below 30 
reached 30, 
but below 60 
reached 60 
or above 
Provision-Point Return: $0.00 $5.00 $10.00 
 
According to the payoff model (in Chapter 5), the individual payoff can be realized in three 
ways, given the provision points and provision point returns. Thus, in Stage 1, Rounds 1 to 5 
three possible individual pay-off structures are represented in the following table:  
Table 2: Stage 1, Rounds 1 to 5: Individual Payoff Structures 
Group Investment Range of all 7 players Individual Earnings 𝒆𝒊 , (𝟎 ≤ 𝒙 ≤ 𝟐𝟓) 
Total Group Investment ≤ 30 𝑒𝑖 = [(25 − 𝑥) × 0.10] + 0 
30 ≤ Total Group Investment ≤ 60 𝑒𝑖 = [(25 − 𝑥) × 0.10] + 5 
Total Group Investment ≥ 60 𝑒𝑖 = [(25 − 𝑥) × 0.10] + 10 
 
The second treatment of Stage 1 of the game was imposed in the Rounds 6 to 10. Everything 
else remained same, except, they were presented with four investment options with increased 
provision points as shown in table 3:  
Table 3: Stage1: Treatment 2: Rebate=No 
Range of Total Investments: 
below 
70 
reached 70, 
but below 
140 
reached 140, 
but below 
210 
reached 
210, 
or above  
Provision-Point Return: $0.00 $5.00 $10.00 $15.00 
 
The individual payoffs are realised in the same way as was in Rounds 1 to 5. The table below 
presents the possible payoffs: 
Table 4: Stage 1, Rounds 6 to 10: Individual Payoff Structures 
Group Investment Range of all 7 players Individual Earnings 𝒆𝒊 , (𝟎 ≤ 𝒙 ≤ 𝟐𝟓) 
Total Group Investment ≤ 70 𝑒𝑖 = [(25 − 𝑥) × 0.10] + 0 
70 ≤ Total Group Investment ≤ 140 𝑒𝑖 = [(25 − 𝑥) × 0.10] + 5 
140 ≤Total Group Investment ≤ 210 𝑒𝑖 = [(25 − 𝑥) × 0.10] + 10 
Total Group Investment ≥ 210 𝑒𝑖 = [(25 − 𝑥) × 0.10] + 15 
 
After the first ten rounds, the participants were asked to log in to a different session to play 
for Stage 2. The first 5 rounds in the second stage had the same investment options and provi-
sion point returns as that of Rounds 1 to 5 in Stage 1 (table 5): 
Table 5: Stage2: Treatment 1: Rebate=Yes 
Range of Total Group Investments: below 30 
reached 30, 
but below 60 
reached 60 
or above 
Provision-Point Return: $0.00 $5.00 $10.00 
 
 However, the participants could communicate with their group members and coordinate the 
investment if they wished to do so. The participants were given five minutes to discuss before 
investing. In Rounds 1 to 5, the treatment of rebate was also introduced. That is, if the total 
group investment did not reach any threshold/provision point, any tokens invested was re-
turned to participants and they earned $0.10 on each of those returned tokens. The possible 
individual payoff structures for Stage 2, Rounds 1 to 5 are given in the following table: 
Table 6: Stage 2, Rounds 1 to 5: Individual Payoff Structures 
Group Investment Range of all 7 players Individual Earnings 𝒆𝒊 , (𝟎 ≤ 𝒙 ≤ 𝟐𝟓) 
Total Group Investment ≤ 30 𝑒𝑖 = (25 × 0.10) + 0 = 2.5 
30 ≤ Total Group Investment ≤ 60 𝑒𝑖 = [(25 − 𝑥) × 0.10] + 5 
Total Group Investment ≥ 60 𝑒𝑖 = [(25 − 𝑥) × 0.10] + 10 
 
In Rounds 6 to 10 of the second stage of the game, the participants were given a new endow-
ment of 50 tokens and the rebate was removed from the treatment. That is, tokens were not 
returned upon failure to meet any provision point. The participants were again allowed to 
communicate with their group members for 5 minutes before investing and the provision 
points were increased along with the range of total group investment options as shown in ta-
ble 4:  
Table 7: Stage2: Treatment 2: Rebate=No 
Range of Total Group 
Investments: 
below 70 
reached 70, 
but below 140 
reached 140, 
but below 
210 
reached 210, 
but below 
280 
reached 280 
or above 
Provision-Point Re-
turn: 
$0.00 $5.00 $10.00 $15.00 $20.00 
 
The payoff structure for Rounds 6 to 10 in stage 2 for each provision point is summarized in 
table 8. As the provision point was raised, the initial endowment also had to be raised (from 
25 tokens to 50 tokens) in order for the participants to be able to reach the threshold 
successfully.  
 
Table 8: Stage 2, Rounds 6 to 10: Individual Payoff Structures 
Group Investment Range of all 7 players Individual Earnings 𝒆𝒊 , (𝟎 ≤ 𝒙 ≤ 𝟐𝟓) 
Total Group Investment ≤ 70 𝑒𝑖 = [(50 − 𝑥) × 0.10] + 0 
70 ≤ Total Group Investment ≤ 140 𝑒𝑖 = [(50 − 𝑥) × 0.10] + 5 
140 ≤Total Group Investment ≤ 210 𝑒𝑖 = [(50 − 𝑥) × 0.10] + 10 
210 ≤Total Group Investment ≤ 280 𝑒𝑖 = [(50 − 𝑥) × 0.10] + 15 
Total Group Investment ≤ 280 𝑒𝑖 = [(50 − 𝑥) × 0.10] + 20 
 
The game lasted for 2 hours as the participants were allowed to go on their own pace to 
complete each round. After the game, the survey was conducted. In order to answer the 
survey questions, the participants were asked to log in a different session on the same 
website. After the whole experiment was done, the winners (one from each group) were 
announced and paid through bank transfer. 
In the next Chapter, the results are presented along with the analysis of both stages of the 
game. 
 
7. Results and Analysis 
The pilot experiment had a sample population of 14 participants but only 4 were male and 10 
were female. On the other hand, all the participants were within the age range of 20 to 30 ex-
cept one. Thus, controlling for age is also not possible. As an analysis controlling for gender 
and age with such a small and skewed population sample is unlikely to offer any conclusive 
results, these control factors are omitted in the analysis.  
In this Chapter, I will focus on several questions in accordance with the hypotheses stated in 
section 6.3. In Section 6.5.1, I present the analysis of the experiment results, which includes 
overall contribution rate of both groups in both stages, and in Section 6.5.2 the survey data is 
analysed in comparison of contribution levels of the two groups. 
 
7.1. Experiment Data analysis 
In this section, the analysis focuses on the first three hypotheses mentioned in section 6.3. 
Figure 1 and 2 represents the average contributions of Group 1 and 2 respectively. In the fig-
ures, the straight lines represent the provision points to be met by the total group contribution 
to get threshold returns. Each of these lines are the socially optimum equilibrium. Each dot of 
the scatter plot is the average group contributions per round.  
Figure 1: Group 1 Average Voluntary Contribution: Stage 1, Rounds 1 to 10 
 
Figure 2: Group 2 Average Voluntary Contribution: Stage 1, Rounds 1 to 10 
 
Looking at the data, it can be seen that both groups contributed more than required amount 
for the highest provision point (the socially optimum equilibrium). Nevertheless, the data 
shows that both Groups shows a tendency to diverge towards the equilibrium point by the 5th 
round, but only Group 1 was able to meet the equilibrium in the 5th round, while Group 2’s 
average contribution was still higher than the equilibrium.  
The second treatment (Rounds 6 to 10) represents an increment in the threshold for provision 
point return, that is, in these rounds, the socially optimum equilibrium requires higher group 
contribution. The average group contribution of Group 1 in Rounds 6 and 7 was higher than 
the lower threshold but shows a tendency to diverge to the lowest threshold in Rounds 8 to 
10. On the other hand, Group 2 was more successful in reaching the highest threshold, that is, 
Group 2 could meet the highest socially optimum equilibrium in most rounds from Round 6 
to 10, except in Round 9 where they marginally fail to meet the equilibrium contribution 
point.  
At this point, two claims can be made:  
1) Group 2 (the culturally heterogenous group) demonstrates a tendency to contribute to the 
highest threshold. Group 1 (the culturally homogenous group) shows a tendency to deviate to 
the lowest threshold and failed to meet the highest socially optimum equilibrium in all rounds 
in the second treatment.  
2) Cooperation was successfully achieved without communication by the culturally hetero-
genous group, but not by the culturally homogeneous group.  
Figures 3 and 4 presents the average voluntary contribution of Group 1 and Group 2 respec-
tively in the second stage of the game in which they could communicate before investing for 
the provision of the public good. The communication took place twice: once before playing 
for Rounds 1 to 5 and another time before playing for Rounds 6 to 10. Along with the factor 
of communication, the rebate rules were different for treatment 1 and treatment 2, in that, 
treatment 1 had a rebate rule of return but treatment 2 did not. Round 1 to 5 in this stage had 
the same threshold points as that of Rounds 1 to 5 in Stage one. However, from Rounds 6 to 
10, the participants were provided with four provision points as can be seen in the figures 3 
and 4.  
Figure 3: Group 1 Average Voluntary Contribution: Stage 2, Rounds 1 to 10 
 
Figure 4: Group 2 Average Voluntary Contribution: Stage 2, Rounds 1 to 10 
 
The results of the second stage favour the prediction that cooperation will increase due to 
communication as can be seen in both Figures 3 and 4 that both groups contributed towards 
the highest threshold and was able to operate at the socially optimum level.  
In round 6, group 2 failed marginally to meet the highest threshold which points towards the 
existence of defection. However, the subsequent rounds show that there was no tendency of 
punishment as the group managed to contribute more than the threshold requirement.  
The results of Group 1 at this stage demonstrates that they were able to contribute the exact 
amount for the socially optimum output from Rounds 6 to 10. At this point, the hypothesis 
H01: Defection will occur at a higher rate in Rounds 6 to 10 in both stages due to high 
threshold points can be rejected.  
While in Rounds 1 to 5, it was Group 2 who’s contribution remained at the socially optimum 
equilibrium and Group 1 shows a slight tendency to defect in Round 5. One explanation for 
this would be that the rebate rule of money back increased cooperation in Group 2 but did not 
eliminate the tendency of defection in Group 1. This can also be verified from the failure of 
meeting the highest provision point by Group 2 in round 6 when the rebate rule was again 
change to ‘no return’. However, while it may suggest that difference in rebate rule have an 
effect on individual contribution level, it does not undermine the effect of communication as 
both groups were able to contribute at the socially optimum level in the subsequent rounds. 
Thus, the hypothesis H03-2: Effect of communication in Stage 2 Rounds 6 to 10 will be lower 
as rebate rule of return is removed and risk of losing money is increased is rejected. 
Moreover, to know whether cooperation was achieved or not due to the treatment factor of 
communication, it is important to look at individual average contributions in the control stage 
(Stage 1) and the treatment stage (Stage 2). The difference in individual average contribution 
is the two stages are presented by Figure 5 below:  
Figure 5: Effect of Communication on Average Individual Contribution in both stages 
 
In Figure 5, individual average contribution in Stage 1 through Rounds 1 to 10 is represented 
by the blue line and individual average contribution in Stage 2 through Rounds 1 to 10 is rep-
resented by the yellow line. From this result, it can be said that while some players were more 
generous regarding their individual contribution level in the control stage (stage 1), the treat-
ment effect of communication in Stage 2 clearly shows cooperation in terms of average indi-
vidual contribution. Thus, we accept the hypothesis H03: Communication will increase aver-
age investment in all rounds of Stage 2 
Although, the total group contribution reduced in Rounds 1 to 5 in Stage 2 from that of 
Rounds 1 to 5 in Stage 1. Individual contribution per stage, along with the difference in con-
tribution is given in table 9. It is worth noting that in introducing the factor of communica-
tion, all other factors being held equal, participants of both groups reduced their amount of 
contribution. More precisely, in case of the Chinese population sample, the contribution level 
reduced by 17.34% upon the introduction of communication in the 1st five rounds of Stage 2 
when all else were held equal to that of Stage 1. In case of the mixed western population, the 
contribution level reduced by 17.79% under the same scenario. However, the contribution 
level was increased from Rounds 6 to 10 in Stage 2 upon introducing higher threshold level. 
Which means, participants had a clear tendency to cooperate for the provision of the high cost 
public good. Here, the hypothesis H03-1: Average investment will be higher in Stage 2 Rounds 
1 to 5 due to the rebate rule of return is rejected. 
Table 9: Change in total Contributions in Rounds 1 to 10 for both Stages. 
Round Group 1, 
Stage 1 
Total 
Group 2, 
Stage 1 
Total 
Group 1, 
Stage 2 
Total 
Group2, 
Stage 2 
Total 
Change in con-
tribution: From 
Stage 1 to Stage 
2: Group 1 
Change in 
contribution: 
From stage 1 
to Stage 2: 
Group 2 
1 72 70 61 60 -11 -10 
2 79 83 59 63 -20 -20 
3 68 72 56 61 -12 -11 
4 67 79 58 61 -9 -18 
5 60 67 52 60 -8 -7 
6 96 140 280 263 184 123 
7 95 141 280 290 185 149 
8 71 143 280 282 209 139 
9 67 134 280 279 213 145 
10 77 144 280 281 203 137 
 
As the sample size is small, a t-test using paired two sample-mean was conducted to deter-
mine the mean difference of contribution decision of each group in the two stages. Table 10 
summarizes the result for Group 1’s contribution in the two stages and Table 11 summarizes 
the statistics for Group 2: 
Table 10: t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Mean: Group 1: Stage 1 and 2 
Group 1 Stage 1 Stage 2 
Mean 75.2 168.6 
Variance 143.0666667 13794.04444 
Observations 10 10 
Pearson Correlation 0.534658281   
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
Df 9   
t Stat -
2.648653491 
  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.013267349   
t Critical one-tail 1.833112933   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.026534698   
t Critical two-tail 2.262157163   
 
Table 11: t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Mean: Group 2: Stages 1 and 2 
 
Group 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 
Mean 107.3 170 
Variance 1243.566667 13245.11111 
Observations 10 10 
Pearson Correlation 0.989316447   
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
Df 9   
t Stat -
2.467193449 
  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.017867216   
t Critical one-tail 1.833112933   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.035734432   
t Critical two-tail 2.262157163   
 
Comparing the actual t-test value to the t-Critical two-tail statistic, P (T <= t) two tail (Group 
1:0.026534698; Group 2: 0.035734432) gives the probability that the absolute value of the t-
Statistic (Group 1: -2.648653491; Group 2: -2.467193449) would be observed that is slightly 
larger in absolute value than the Critical t value (2.262157163).  Since the p-value is greater 
than 0.05 in both cases, the alternate hypothesis that there is a mean difference is accepted. 
The Pearson correlation statistic suggests that Group 2 has a more uniform decision in both 
stages as it is almost perfectly correlated (0.98), but in case of Group 1, the correlation coeffi-
cient is 0.53 which suggests non-uniformity in behaviour of the Group between the two 
stages.  
For a better understanding of the difference in total contribution of the two groups in all ten 
rounds of both stages, a Wilcoxon Sign rank test was done to verify behavioural differences 
between the contribution level of the two groups taking similar approach to the game. The 
box plot of the variances in total contribution are given in Appendix B. The results suggest 
that there is a significant difference between the two-group’s contribution in Stage 1 (p-
value=0.006838; Group 1 median= 71.5; Group 2 median=108.5). The difference is reduced 
to a non-significant level in Stage 2 (p-value=0.1677; Group 1 median=170.5; Group 2 me-
dian= 163). This confirms that though the groups were provided with the same situations 
throughout the game, Group 1’s contribution level significantly increased in Stage 2, while 
Group 2 demonstrated success in reaching the highest threshold in Stage 1. That is, it is evi-
dent that the treatment effect of communication was greater on the Chinese participants, 
while the heterogenous group members could coordinate without communicating. 
Thus, at this point, it can be claimed that:  
1) In accordance with previous literature of public good experiments, communication 
significantly increases cooperation, however, it has been proven by establishing both 
correlation and causation that the effect of communication is substantial in the culturally 
homogenous group.  
2) No significant impact of rebate rule of return/ no return could be determined. 
 
7.2. Survey data analysis 
In this section, I analyse the post experiment survey which asked basic questions about the 
participants, such as, age, gender, nationality, education level and profession. The 
questionnaire also included 10 statements on climate change beliefs which are presented in 
table 12 along with the average response score. The purpose of the questionnaire was to 
control for behavioural biases.  
 
Table 12: Survey Questionnaire: Belief Statements 
Beliefs 
on: 
Statements Average 
Response 
Score 
R
is
k
 P
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
 
1.  Due to climate change, my chances of suffering from a serious 
disease will increase 
2.00 
2. Starvation and food shortages will occur where I live. 3.00 
3. It will be necessary for richer countries to make large dona-
tions of financial aid-to poorer countries. 
2.50 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t 
R
o
le
 
1. Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient in waste 
management. 
2.93 
2. Government often does a better job than people give it credit 
for. 
3.57 
3. Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the 
public interest. 
2.29 
4. Most elected officials don’t care what people like me think. 2.29 
E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
en
ta
l 
B
el
ie
fs
 
1. Pollution generated here harms people and effects the general 
health of people all over the earth. 
1.93 
2. Laws to protect the environment will limit my choices, 
personal freedom and will threaten jobs for people like me. 
4.00 
H
u
m
an
 
R
ig
h
ts
 Climate change and its consequences are not human rights issue 4.00 
G
lo
b
al
 
C
o
o
p
er
at
io
n
 Every country needs to contribute to protect the earth. 1.64 
Answers on 
Likert Scale 
1= Strongly Agree 2=Agree 3=Indifferent      4= Disagree
    5=Strongly Disagree 
 
Descriptive statistics calculation for the summated total score for each statement was 
conducted using Poisson distribution formulas because of discrete nature of the data which 
includes central tendency, variability (standard deviation and range), skewness, and 
symmetry (kurtosis) in order to define agreeable score for the group of participants. That is, 
mean score, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of the response of each group per 
statement was calculated to determine which group is more agreeable. The detailed statistics 
are provided in Appendix C. A tabular presentation of which group was found to be more 
agreeable to each survey statements are provided by Table 13. 
Group 1 (participants from China) is found to be more agreeable on the risk perception 
statements compared to their western counterparts. On the other hand, Group 2 is found to be 
more agreeable to one of the negative government role statements (Government role 
statement 1 with probability of agreeability of 77%) while Group 1 is more agreeable to the 
positive government role statement (Government role statement 2 with probability of 
agreeability of 58%). This simply reflects China’s belief and reliability on their government 
system. However, both groups had same degree of agreeability on Government role 
statements 3 and Government role statement 4 (mean=2.28571429 for both groups with 
probability of agreeability was found to be 80% on both statements). 
For the environmental belief statements, Group 2 was found to be more agreeable to 
statement 1 with a probability of agreeability of 94% and Group 1 was more agreeable in case 
of statement 2 with a probability of 58%. In case of the global cooperation question, 
participants of Group 2 provided a uniform distribution (probability of agreeability of 98%) 
while more people from Group 1 agreed to the human rights statement (probability of 55%).  
  
Table 13: Listing of agreeable group per statement 
Statements More agreeable Group 
Risk Perception 1 Group 1  
Risk Perception 2 Group 1 
Risk Perception 3 Group 1 
Government Role 1 Group 2 
Government Role 2  Group 1 
Government Role 3 Same Agreeability 
Government Role 4 Same Agreeability 
Environmental Belief 1 Group 2 
Environmental Belief 2 Group 1 
Human Rights Group 1 
Global Cooperation Group 2 
 
As the aim of the thesis is to establish relationship between contribution estimates and 
beliefs, after the response pattern of each group to the survey statements are established, the 
Pearson coefficient is calculated for each group’s investment in the two stages of the game 
with the different categories of belief statements were done separately.  
A comparison of the correlation results of Group 1 with Group 2 for each statement is done 
using Pearson’s correlation coefficients. Table 14 summarizes the statistics correlation 
between risk perception and individual average contribution for both groups in stage one.  
A negative correlation means that participants whose response was on the agreement side (1 
to 3) of the statements, contributed more or participants whose response was on the 
disagreement side of the scale (3 to 5), contributed less (as the scale is 1=Strongly Agree to 
5=Strongly Disagree).  
Group 1 shows a positive correlation with risk perception statement “It will be necessary for 
richer countries to make large donations of financial aid-to poorer countries” and previously 
it has been seen that Group 1 was more agreeable to the statement which suggests that 
participants of the group who agreed to the statement relatively contributed less. On the other 
hand, all three risk perception statements have a negative correlation with the contributions of 
participants in Group 2, which means agreeing participants probably contributed more and 
disagreeing participants contributed less relatively speaking. However, the correlation 
coefficients for Group 1 suggests most of the risk perception statements are moderately 
correlated, and for Group 2, risk perception 1 is weakly correlated but risk perception 2 and 4 
are moderately correlated. Although, the p-value suggests the test is insignificant which 
might be because the sample size is too small. 
Table 14: Pearson’s Correlation Statistics: Risk Perceptions and Stage 1 Contributions 
Average 
Individual 
Contribu-
tion 
Belief State-
ment 
Correla-
tion Coef-
ficient 
t-test df p-
value 
Confidence 
Interval 
 
 
Group 1 
Stage 1 
Risk percep-
tion 1 
-0.1553387 -0.35162 5 0.7395 
 
-0.8132622, 
0.6769029 
Risk percep-
tion 2 
-0.3864674 
 
-0.93697 
 
5 0.3918 
 
-0.8826467, 
0.5170768 
Risk percep-
tion 3 
0.3779914 
 
0.91295 
 
5 0.4031 
 
-0.5243118, 
0.8804343 
 
 
Group 2 
Stage 1 
Risk percep-
tion 1 
-0.0613298 
 
-0.1374 
 
5 0.8961 
 
-0.7784359, 
0.7252226 
Risk percep-
tion 2 
-0.2961621 
 
-0.69334 
 
5 0.519 
 
-0.8578878, 
0.5880464 
Risk percep-
tion 3 
-0.42762 
 
-1.0578 
 
5 0.3386 
 
-0.8930846, 
0.4800133 
 
In case of the government role statements, the correlation is stronger in general than that of 
risk perception statements’ correlations (table 15). For government role 1, Group 1 has a neg-
ative correlation of -0.58 along with the previous finding of the Group being less agreeable in 
this statement means participants contributed relatively less. For the same statement, Group 
2, the more agreeable group, also has a negative correlation but is moderately correlated at -
0.21. That is, participants believing that ‘Government is almost always wasteful and ineffi-
cient in waste management’ showed a tendency to contribute more. 
For government role statement 2, Group 1 has a positive correlation of 0.16 whereas Group 2 
has a negative correlation of -0.29. Though moderately correlated, it suggests that people who 
shows more agreeability with the fact that ‘Government usually does a better job than people 
give it credit for’ tends to contribute less for the provision of a public good.  
As both group’s agreement level for government role statement 3 is the same, the correlation 
between the belief statement and contribution level is 0.66 for both groups. In case of govern-
ment role 4, which showed same agreement for both groups as well, has a negative correla-
tion of -0.62 with contribution for Group 1 but a positive correlation of 0.20 with contribution 
for Group 2. This suggests that in terms of Group 1, the more participants agree to the state-
ment, the higher they contribute while in case of Group 2, the more participants disagree, the 
more is the tendency to contribute. That is, while feeling of insignificant in state official deci-
sion-making process have a different effect on contribution level for the two groups. 
Table 15: Pearson’s Correlation Statistics: Government Role and Stage 1 Contributions 
Average 
Individual 
Contribu-
tion 
Belief State-
ment 
Correla-
tion Coef-
ficient 
t-test df p-
value 
Confidence 
Interval 
 
 
 
 
Group 1 
Govt. Role 1 -0.5837404 -1.6076 
 
5 0.1688 
 
-0.9285964, 
0.3021321 
Govt. Role 2 0.1594655 
 
0.3612 
 
5 0.7327 
 
-0.6746036, 
0.8146901 
Govt. Role 3 0.6644945 1.9883 
 
5 0.1035 
 
-0.1772701, 
0.9447813 
Govt. Role 4 -0.6206637 -1.77 
 
5 0.1369 
 
-0.9361631, 
0.2485793 
 
 
 
Group 2 
 
Govt. Role 1 -0.2103999 -0.48124 
 
5 0.6507 
 
-0.8316833, 
0.6448267 
Govt. Role 2 -0.2932023 -0.68576 
 
5 0.5234 
 
-0.8570297, 
0.5901628 
Govt. Role 3 0.6644945 
 
0.12331 
 
5 0.9067 
 
-0.7281899, 
0.7759461 
Govt. Role 4 0.2081056 
 
0.47575 
 
5 0.6543 
 
-0.6462262, 
0.8309421 
 
For the environmental belief statement 1 and contribution of Group 1 has a positive correla-
tion of 0.33 and Group 2 has a stronger positive correlation of 0.49. For environmental belief 
2, Group 1 has a weakly negative correlation of -0.19 and Group 2 has a moderately strong 
negative correlation of -0.41. In case of participants’ belief that climate change is a human 
rights issue, Group 1’s contribution level with the belief statement shows a stronger negative 
correlation of -0.67 while for Group 2 the correlation is strong and positive of 0.80. For the 
human rights statement, the test is significant at p-value<0.05 only for Group 2.  
For the statement suggesting that every country should contribute to protect the earth, contri-
bution level and belief on this statement shows a strong correlation of 0.75 for Group with p-
value=0.05. For Group 2, it is a perfect correlation at +1 (the results show NA due to the uni-
form distribution of the standard deviation). 
Table 16: Pearson’s Correlation Statistics: Environmental Belief, Human Rights, Global Co-
operation and Stage 1 Contributions 
Average 
Individual 
Contribu-
tion 
Belief State-
ment 
Correla-
tion Coef-
ficient 
t-test df p-value Confidence 
Interval 
 
 
 
 
Group 1 
Environmen-
tal Belief 1 
0.325277 0.76917 
 
5 0.4765 -0.5665618, 
0.8661657 
Environmen-
tal Belief 1 
-0.1898914 -
0.43248 
 
5 0.6834 -0.8249782, 
0.6571368 
Human 
Rights 
-0.6668043 -2.0007 
 
5 0.1018 
 
-0.9452249, 
0.1732500 
Global Coop-
eration 
0.7535877 2.5634 
 
5 0.05044 0.001224548, 
0.961180420 
 
 
 
Group 2 
 
Environmen-
tal Belief 1 
0.4890005 1.2535 
 
5 0.2654 
 
-0.4179753, 
0.9077745 
Environmen-
tal Belief 2 
-0.4126667 
 
-1.013 
 
5 0.3575 
 
-0.8893490, 
0.4938663 
Human 
Rights 
0.8004063 
 
2.9856 
 
5 0.0306 
 
0.1191908, 
0.9692479 
Global Coop-
eration 
NA NA NA NA NA 
 
Though the majority of the test results are insignificant at p-value>0.05, it can be at least 
claimed that level of beliefs framed under climate change and contribution level for the 
provision of public good has a varying correlation for the two groups.  
 
8. Discussion 
The results offer some noteworthy differences in group behaviour in a threshold public good 
game. In contrast to theoretical predictions, participants contributed voluntarily towards the 
provision of public good and were successfully able to provide socially optimum results. On 
the other hand, the effect of communication has proved, in accordance with previous litera-
ture, to have high significance on the level of contribution and cooperation. However, there 
was no evidence of punishment in this particular experiment, and whether the cooperation 
was a result of reciprocity could not be determined either. Contrary to previous experiments 
and literature, contribution and cooperation in this experiment increased with repetition of the 
game. 
The study has confirmed that a mixed western population sample showed a tendency to con-
tribute towards the highest provision point and were able to cooperate and gain sanction even 
without having the factor of communication introduced. One might argue that there was a fi-
nancial incentive in the lab to cooperate. It is worth pointing out that the real payoff structure 
suggested to win the reward for the game, one must maximise his/her own payoff in the game 
which stays in line with the equilibrium output and not the socially optimum output in the 
game. Thus, the study reflects on the fact that for some countries, private sector can effi-
ciently contribute towards the provision of public good. 
Upon the introduction of the treatment of communication, the contribution level of the popu-
lation sample representative of China offered a substantial rise in contribution level. The ef-
fect of the treatment is most visible in case of this population sample as there was significant 
change in contribution pattern and effectiveness in meeting the highest threshold. As dis-
cussed in the previous Chapter, total contribution level decreased upon the introduction of 
communication when all other factors were held equal (threshold points and initial token en-
dowments) which suggests that communication does not only increase cooperation in terms 
of meeting provision points, but also reduces inefficiency as less wastage of investment oc-
curred in the rounds after the treatment. On the other hand, it is also demonstrated that partic-
ipants were more eager to meet the threshold as they increased their contribution in Rounds 6 
to 10 in the second stage to invest in the highest provision point. This specific finding is in 
contradiction with previous finding of cooperation and contribution to public provision re-
duces in repeated games with increased number of rounds. This may also suggest that the im-
age of a co-operator matters when relationship is established among the group members. The 
factor of maintaining a good-will among social members plays a role, probably more so in 
some nations than others.  
In case of cultural beliefs, it has been shown that there is a correlation between contribution 
level and different categories of beliefs. Particularly, people who believe that climate change 
influences their personal lives (risk perception), tends to contribute more than those who does 
not share the same level of belief. On the other hand, participants who showed more trust to-
wards the government (positive government role statements: 1 and 4), tended to contribute 
less while participants who showed lower level of trust in the role of government (negative 
government role statements: 2 and 3) demonstrated a tendency to contribute more to the pro-
vision of public goods. For example, participants with a more agreeable response to the state-
ment ‘Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient in waste management’, contrib-
uted more and majority of the participants sharing this perception belonged to the culturally 
heterogenous group. On the other hand, participants whose response was more agreeable with 
the statement: ‘Government usually does a better job than people give it credit for’, contrib-
uted less and the majority of the participants sharing this view belonged to the culturally het-
erogenous group. 
Additionally, the unanimous agreement on global cooperation by the heterogenous group im-
plies that the expectation of global cooperation in terms of climate change is higher among 
the western population, while disagreements could be seen among the Chinese population 
sample. This submits to the developed vs developing nation arguments regarding global cli-
mate change cooperation. However, that is a whole other topic! 
8.1 Limitations and Biases 
The thesis has proved significant differences in behaviour of homogenous and heterogenous 
groups in a repeated threshold public good game. However, the experiment had a few limita-
tions and biases which were due to geographical and financial constraints.  
First, the homogeneous group in the experiment was meant to be representative of national 
population, but the participants in the experiment were currently residing in Tampere, Fin-
land. This is likely to have an effect on participants perception and behaviour. Finland being 
one of the highly committed nations in abating climate change consequences12, living in the 
country can be expected to have significant behavioural and belief impacts. Hence, a consid-
erable bias in the behaviour of the participants in this experiment is expected. Second, a more 
comparative analysis regarding cultural beliefs could be done if the experiment was done be-
tween two culturally different groups, that is, instead of the culturally heterogenous group, a 
separate culturally homogenous group being compared to that of the Chinese group would 
have provided more conclusive results on cultural beliefs and the differences. For example, if 
the study was done with one group from US and the other from China, more conclusive re-
sults could be provided on how individual perspectives/beliefs effects contribution level and 
cooperation in the lab. Third, the lack of randomization in the sample restricted any sophisti-
cated analysis of the results. A small sample size also contributed to this issue. Fourth, due to 
time constraints, the survey questions were kept at minimum. A more intensive questionnaire 
would have amplified the scope of the study. Fifth, the sample population had a gender bias 
as the majority of the participants were female. A sample population with more male partici-
pants may have different results. 
 
8.2. Future Possibilities 
The design of the experiment leaves plenty of room for these constraints and biases to be 
avoided in future studies. Due to the nature of the experiment, it is not mandatory to conduct 
the experiment in on room with both the groups. It is possible to provide conclusive results 
by conducting the experiment in two separate locations if environmental factors regarding the 
experiment is maintained in both locations. Given the time and resources, the experiment can 
be conducted in different countries for a more accurate result. A larger sample with a more 
randomized population would provide the scope to control for other factors like gender, age, 
                                                          
12 http://www.climatechangenews.com/2014/06/06/finland-reveals-new-climate-change-laws/ 
profession, and social status.  Moreover, focus on each belief categories can be enhanced by 
increasing the survey contents. On the other hand, the experiment can be focused on each sur-
vey statement factors, for example: a more intensive risk perception questionnaire will pro-
vide results on risk perception and how it effects contribution and cooperation for public 
good provision; a higher focus on beliefs regarding government role will deliver results that 
can be used to understand how each nation’s perspective on their government affects their 
contribution towards public goods; or how different population’s environmental beliefs influ-
ence their behaviour, etc.  
 
9. Conclusion 
The aim of the research was to analyse effectiveness of the national voluntary contribution 
approach of the global climate change policy through an economic experimental approach. 
This was done by examining the cross-cultural differences regarding voluntary contribution 
for the provision of public good in a repeated public good game.  Some assumptions were de-
rived from previous literatures on cooperation and public good games in order to justify la-
boratory participants’ behaviour as a representation of the behaviour of a wider population, 
specifically, international cooperation follows the pattern of individual co-operations which 
entails sacrificing individual interests for group interests.  
Basing on the unique nature of the global climate regime and game theoretical framework, a 
detailed experiment was designed to verify individual and global effort in terms of monetary 
expenditure. The analysis of the experiment results successfully answered the three research 
questions.  
The study was able to prove that between a Chinese population sample and a mixed western 
population sample, the mixed sample had a higher tendency to contribute for the provision of 
public good, as they were able to cooperate even without communicating and contribute to 
the highest threshold point. Further analysis reinforced the significance of effect of communi-
cation on contribution level and cooperation on both correlation and causal study. The factor 
of communication significantly improved cooperation for both groups, however, the impact 
was greater on the Chinese population sample. The contributions of the group provided a so-
cially optimum outcome after the factor of communication was added.  
Furthermore, the study found correlation between different beliefs and contribution level. In 
that, group who believed to have higher personal risk associated with climate change tended 
to have a higher level of overall contribution. Groups that showed lower trust in government 
role to abate for climate change consequences showed a tendency to contribute more, while 
participants who showed empathy/trust towards government had a lower level of contribu-
tion. A descriptive statistical test showed that the Chinese population sample were more 
agreeable to the risk perception questions which mirrors the climate change consequences 
that the country is facing. Moreover, it was the same population sample that was more agree-
able on the positive government role statements, demonstrating trust towards the government. 
As the results suggests that higher trust in the role of government invokes a tendency to con-
tribute less, one might wander: to what extent does the political system of a nation affects 
one’s decision to invest for climate abatement options? If this is indeed the general national 
belief, China might be able to meet her ambitious global climate policy target of 2030 if the 
government puts enough pressure on the private actors to contribute. However, in case of the 
western population sample, the participants showed higher level of distrust towards the role 
of government and had a higher level of cooperation as well. Which, not-so-surprisingly, im-
plies that cooperation on a domestic level from the more democratic societies will be 
achieved through private market rather than coercion. 
Though the test results were not significant, these finding may have better policy implications 
if done on a larger scale. Meaning, if these relations are consistent, it will enable policy mak-
ers to determine which sector of a given nation, private or public, will provide a socially opti-
mum output concerning climate change abatement investments and to what extent. 
The research did more than answering the research questions-the results of the experiment 
were exceptions in two cases: first, it did not provide evidence for the previously theorized 
concept that defection is followed by defection as group members tend to do so in order to 
punish the defector even at higher personal cost; second, cooperation did not decrease with 
subsequent rounds. If anything, cooperation increased, and the participants provided socially 
optimum output even on the last rounds.  
Taking a last look on the Paris agreement, the discussion confirms the polycentric approach 
taken by the agreement, based on immediate actions to reduce GHG emissions at multiple 
levels, global, national and subnational, may be justified by economic analysis, even if the 
analysis is not based on the conventional approach. The polycentric approach allows for im-
plementation of different types of policies, so that the resolution of the problem no longer de-
pends on a single solution whose failure would be catastrophic. As Ostrom ultimately argues 
that the most rational approach involves multi-policy, multi-scale action, the Paris agreement 
seems to be the first step towards that direction. However, the success of achieving the long-
term goals of the agreement, will depend primarily on building greater trust and confidence 
across countries, as well as, between private actors and governments. This thesis suggests a 
possible way to understand and analyse to what extent these sorts of beliefs varies across na-
tions. 
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Appendix A: Experiment Instruction 
 
Welcome to the Experiment!  
Declaration: This is an investment decision-making experiment, conducted on-line, solely for 
the purpose of research and does not, in any way, reflects your cognitive capability or intelli-
gence. You can choose to stay anonymous by providing pseudonym if you want. You can 
leave now if you don’t wish to participate. 
 
Instructions for the Experiment:  
You are required to not speak to each other unless said otherwise by the instructor. 
To play the game, you first need to go to the following website:  http://veconlab.econ.vir-
ginia.edu/login.htm  
The game will be played in three sessions. For each session, you are given a log in id. Please 
do not log in unless you are asked to by the experimenter. 
After logging in to each session, you will be provided with further instructions. 
Please used the following session names when asked to log in:  
 
• Experiment Stage 1: Session 1: tpgz1 
• Experiment Stage 2: Session 2: tpgz2 
• Survey: Session 3: tpgz2q 
 
 
Conversion of the winning amount:  
 
There will be 2 winners, one from each part of the game. Your earnings are determined as 
‘electronic currency’ in the game but the real pay-off amount will be converted as follows:  
1 electronic currency = 0.10 Euro 
For example, if the highest earner gets a total of 50 electronic currency after the first 10 
rounds, he or she will get (50x0.10) = €5 in cash or bank transfer.  
 
Please feel free to ask if you have any question.  
 
 
 
Thank you for participating 😊 
Appendix B: Experiment data: Comparison of Stage wise total investment of Group 1 and 2 
 
  
  
Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics of Survey Data 
 
Group 1 
 
ID (1-7) 
  
Group 2 
 
ID (8-14) 
  
Defining Agreeable as Score including and less than 3 for all questions 
Using Poisson distribution formulas because of discrete nature of the data 
 
  RiskPerception1 RiskPerception2 RiskPerception3 
  Group 1 Group2 Group 1 Group2 Group 1 Group2 
ANSWERS 
for survey  
Questions by 
Group 1  
and Group 2  
(1 = Strongly 
Agree,  
5 = Strongly 
Disagree) 
1 2 2 2 5 1 
4 3 2 5 2 4 
2 1 4 4 2 3 
3 3 4 4 3 2 
1 1 4 2 2 3 
1 2 1 4 1 2 
1 3 2 2 1 4 
Mean 
1.857142
86 
2.142857
14 
2.714285
71 
3.285714
29 
2.285714
29 
2.714285
71 
Standard De-
viation 
1.214985
79 
0.899735
41 
1.253566
34 
1.253566
34 
1.380131
12 
1.112697
28 
Kurtosis 
-
0.056815
8 
-
1.816609 
-
2.071074
4 
-
2.071074
4 2.3205 
-
0.944378
7 
Skewness 
1.146966
82 
-
0.353045 
0.029008
15 
-
0.029008
1 
1.423777
77 
-
0.248875
5 
Minimum 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Maximum 4 3 4 5 5 4 
Probability of 
Agreeability 0.881938 
0.830469
2 
0.710940
18 
0.583496
1 
0.802245
09 
0.710940
18 
More Agreea-
ble Groups  
for each sur-
vey Group 1 Group 1 Group 1 
 
 
  
     
  GovernmentRole1 GovernmentRole4 
  Group 1 Group2 Group 1 Group2 
ANSWERS for sur-
vey  
Questions by Group 1  
and Group 2  
(1 = Strongly Agree,  
5 = Strongly Disa-
gree) 
2 1 2 2 
3 3 2 2 
4 2 2 1 
4 3 3 3 
2 3 3 3 
5 2 3 2 
4 3 1 3 
Mean 3.42857143 2.42857143 2.28571429 2.28571429 
Standard Deviation 1.13389342 0.78679579 0.75592895 0.75592895 
Kurtosis -1.2271605 0.27337278 -0.35 -0.35 
Skewness -0.2351779 -1.1145498 -0.595294 -0.595294 
Minimum 2 1 1 1 
Maximum 5 3 3 3 
Probability of Agree-
ability 0.55212156 0.77273012 0.80224509 0.80224509 
More Agreeable 
Groups  
for each survey Group 2 
SAME AGREEABIL-
ITY 
 
     
  GovernmentRole2 GovernmentRole3 
  Group 1 Group2 Group 1 Group2 
ANSWERS for sur-
vey  
Questions by Group 1  
and Group 2  
(1 = Strongly Agree,  
5 4 5 2 
2 4 3 1 
3 5 2 5 
3 3 2 1 
4 4 2 3 
4 4 1 2 
5 = Strongly Disa-
gree) 2 3 1 2 
Mean 3.28571429 3.85714286 2.28571429 2.28571429 
Standard Deviation 1.11269728 0.69006556 1.38013112 1.38013112 
Kurtosis -0.9443787 0.336 2.3205 2.3205 
Skewness 0.24887549 0.17389652 1.42377777 1.42377777 
Minimum 2 3 1 1 
Maximum 5 5 5 5 
Probability of Agree-
ability 0.5834961 0.46186543 0.80224509 0.80224509 
More Agreeable 
Groups  
for each survey Group 1 
SAME AGRREEABIL-
ITY 
 
  EnvironmentalBelief1 EnvironmentalBelief2 
  Group 1 Group2 Group 1 Group2 
ANSWERS for sur-
vey  
Questions by Group 1  
and Group 2  
(1 = Strongly Agree,  
5 = Strongly Disa-
gree) 
2 1 3 5 
4 1 3 5 
1 1 3 4 
2 2 4 5 
2 2 4 5 
1 2 2 4 
5 1 4 5 
Mean 2.42857143 1.42857143 3.28571429 4.71428571 
Standard Deviation 1.51185789 0.53452248 0.75592895 0.48795004 
Kurtosis -0.196875 -2.8 -0.35 -0.84 
Skewness 1.00042471 0.37416574 -0.595294 -1.2296341 
Minimum 1 1 2 4 
Maximum 5 2 4 5 
Probability of Agree-
ability 0.77273012 0.94300005 0.5834961 0.30744105 
More Agreeable 
Groups  
for each survey Group 2 Group 1 
 
Disagreeable IDs 3, 4, 5, 6 
8, 10, 11,  
12, 13, 14 1, 2 None 
  HumanRights GlobalCooperation 
  Group 1 Group2 Group 1 Group2 
ANSWERS for sur-
vey  
Questions by Group 1  
and Group 2  
(1 = Strongly Agree,  
5 = Strongly Disa-
gree) 
2 5 5 1 
2 2 5 1 
5 5 1 1 
4 5 1 1 
4 5 2 1 
5 5 1 1 
2 5 1 1 
Mean 3.42857143 4.57142857 2.28571429 1 
Standard Deviation 1.39727626 1.13389342 1.88982237 0 
Kurtosis -2.3511005 7 -1.02816 
Uniform 
Distro 
Skewness -0.0523667 -2.6457513 1.08793294 
Uniform 
Distro 
Minimum 2 2 1 1 
Maximum 5 5 5 1 
Probability of Agree-
ability 0.55212156 0.33038849 0.80224509 0.98101184 
More Agreeable 
Groups  
for each survey Group 1 Group 2 
 
 
